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I. INTRODUCTION
In what is unlikely to be the last in a long line of hotly debated
cases, spanning at least the last decade, the Delaware Court of Chancery
recently held that management's free cash flow' projections are not
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2012; B.A., Business Management, Finance Emphasis, Brigham Young
University, 2009. I would like to thank my wife, Sariah Mattinson, for her love and
support. I would also like to thank Professor Samuel C. Thompson Jr. of The Dickinson
School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University for his invaluable guidance and
direction.
1. ARTHUR J. KEOWN ET AL., FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND
APPLICATIONS 45 (*Pearson Custom Publ'g, 10th ed. 2005) (defining free cash flows as
"the amount of cash available from operations after paying for investments in net
operating working capital and fixed assets"); SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR., BUSINESS
PLANNING FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: CORPORATE, SECURITIES, TAX, ANTITRUST,
INTERNATIONAL, AND RELATED ASPECTS 376 (Carolina Academic Press, 3rd ed. 2008)
(stating that free cash flows equal the income stream to the corporation, not accounting
profits).
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material. 2 By way of illustration, Company A, the acquiring corporation,
is interested in acquiring Company T, the target corporation. The
acquiring corporation negotiates with the target corporation and the
companies agree to a first-step tender offer for all of the target
corporation's shares, followed by a second-step merger. The target
corporation chooses to disclose certain information to its shareholders, in
anticipation of a shareholder vote on the merger, so that the shareholders
can decide how to vote and whether to tender their shares. The target
corporation's shareholders have an important decision to make: whether
to accept the consideration offered in the tender offer in exchange for
tendering their shares or to decline to tender their shares and either later
accept the merger consideration as part of the proposed second-step
merger or seek appraisal rights after the consummation of the merger.
For the target corporation's shareholders, certain information they wish
for the target corporation to disclose as they make their decision is
material and thus required to be disclosed. Other information is simply
helpful and thus not required to be disclosed.5
This Comment will address the issue of what disclosures Delaware
law requires a company to make to its shareholders in a merger proxy or
consensual tender offer situation and whether a target company's internal
free cash flow projections rise to the level of materiality.6 Chancellor
Chandler of the Delaware Court of Chancery recently concluded that
projected free cash flow estimates7 are not material and disclosure of a
target company's projected free cash flows are not necessary.
Additionally, Chancellor Chandler offered to sign an order certifying an
interlocutory appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court on the issue of
whether free cash flows are material and should always be disclosed as a
2. Steamfitters Local Union 447 v. Walter, No. 5492-CC, slip op. at 9 (Del. Ch.
June 21, 2010) (holding that free cash flow projections are not material because they do
not meaningfully alter the total mix of information available to the stockholder and are
thus not required to be disclosed).
3. See In re PNB Holding Co. S'holders Litig., No. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999, at
*16 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006).
4. Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1171 (Del. 2000). The current
disclosure rule under Delaware case law is that directors have a duty to disclose all
material facts within their control that a reasonable stockholder would consider
important. Id.
5. Id. at 1174. Practically speaking, however, a corporation is likely to be sued at
some point during a merger regardless of what the corporation discloses.
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. Free cash flow estimates are management's estimates of the corporation's
projected future cash flows. See Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc.,
No. 5402-VCS, 2010 WL 1931084, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2010).
8. Steamfitters Local Union 447 v. Walter, No. 5492-CC, slip op. at 9 (Del. Ch.
June 21, 2010).
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per se rule.9 The plaintiff in that case, however, decided not to pursue
the interlocutory appeal.' 0
Several Delaware cases over the last 11 years differ on whether
projected free cash flows are material information that parties to an
agreement must disclose." Interestingly, two judicial perspectives exist
in the Delaware Court of Chancery that divide Chancellor Chandler,12
who consistently does not require disclosure of free cash flows, from
Vice Chancellor Strine,' 3 who consistently requires disclosure of free
cash flows.14  The disparity in case law has led to uncertainty in the
marketplace and has made difficult the board of directors', corporate
officers', and attorneys' predictions regarding the materiality of
projected free cash flows.' 5 The judges distinguished and explained the
differing results on facts that are arguably of little significance.' 6 For
reasons of public policy, financial theory, and clarity, along with the ease
of requiring disclosure and the few accompanying negative side effects,
the Delaware Supreme Court should require, by means of a rebuttable
presumption, that projected free cash flows be deemed material and
disclosed to stockholders in a merger proxy or tender offer.' 7
Part II of this Comment will provide a background of the foundation
and formation of the law surrounding the disclosure of free cash flows in
Delaware, including the standards of proof to which the parties are held.
Next, this Comment delves into the major cases that form current
9. Id. at 10.
10. E-mail from Lisa A. Schmidt, Director, Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., to
author (Aug. 26, 2010, 17:26 EST) (on file with author).
11. The cases in Delaware that hold that (a) disclosure of projections is not generally
required are the following: Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170 (Del. 2000);
Steamfitters Local Union 447 v. Walter, No. 5492-CC, slip op. (Del. Ch. June 21, 2010);
In re Checkfree Corp. S'holder Litig., No. 3193-CC, 2007 WL 3262188 (Del. Ch. Nov.
1, 2007); In re Best Lock Corp. S'holder Litig., 845 A.2d 1057 (Del Ch. 2001), and (b)
disclosure of projections is required: Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning,
Inc., No. 5402-VCS, 2010 WL 1931084 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2010); In re Netsmart Techs.,
Inc. S'holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007).
12. Chancellor Chandler left the Delaware Court of Chancery in 2011. JUDICIAL
OFFICERS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY, http://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/judges.stm
(last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
13. Leo E. Strine, Jr. was appointed as Chancellor of the Delaware Court of
Chancery in 2011. JUDICIAL OFFICERS, supra note 12.
14. Compare In re Checkfree, 2007 WL 3262188, at *3 (holding that free cash flow
projections are not material and need not be disclosed), with Maric, 2010 WL 1931084,
at *2 (holding that free cash flow projections are material and thus are required to be
disclosed to shareholders).
15. See, e.g., Steamfitters, No. 5492-CC, slip op. at 10.
16. See, e.g., In re Checkfree, 2007 WL 3262188, at *2 (holding that a failure to
disclose all the financial data necessary for a stockholder to independently determine the
fair value of his shares is not per se an omission of a material fact).
17. See infra Part IV.
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Delaware law on materiality in this context and points out the significant
differences between the decisions by Chancellor Chandler and Vice
Chancellor Strine.
Part III of this Comment will explore why the current rule in
Delaware is problematic. The analysis focuses on the divide in the
decisions by Chancellor Chandler and Vice Chancellor Strine. This
Comment will discuss the concept of the reasonable stockholder, a
critical element of the materiality standard largely ignored and left
undeveloped by Delaware courts, as well as the relevance of financial
theory to materiality. Additionally, this Comment will briefly address
public policy reasons for why a per se rule should be adopted and will
discuss how materiality of free cash flow projections are treated under
both the Federal Securities Laws and select European laws.
Part IV of this comment proposes a rule that projected free cash
flows be disclosed to stockholders in a merger proxy or tender offer
situation by means of a rebuttable presumption and discusses the
implications of adopting such a proposed rule on the current merger and
acquisition ("M&A") marketplace. This Comment will show that the
adoption of a rebuttable presumption is favorable for the investor, is
simple for companies to implement, will attract more investors to
Delaware corporations, and carries few negative side effects.
II. BACKGROUND
Directors of a Delaware corporation owe certain fiduciary duties to
a Delaware corporation's stockholders.18 One of these fiduciary duties is
the duty of disclosure, also sometimes called the duty of candor.19 Under
Delaware law, directors have a duty to disclose all material facts within
their control that a reasonable stockholder would consider important in
deciding how to respond to the pending transaction. 20 Omitted facts are
material when "a substantial likelihood [exists] that a reasonable
stockholder would consider the facts important in deciding how to vote,"
or, alternatively, when the reasonable stockholder would view the
disclosure as significantly altering the total mix of available
18. See Skeen, 750 A.2d at 1172; In re Checkfree, 2007 WL 3262188, at *2. See
also Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 60 (Del. Ch. 2000) (finding that the director's failure
to disclose material information was a breach of their duty of care).
19. The duty of disclosure is not a "separate and distinct" fiduciary duty but is
subsidiary to the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. See Skeen, 750 A.2d at 1172; In re
Checkfree, 2007 WL 3262188, at *2.
20. See, e.g., Skeen, 750 A.2d at 1171; In re Checkfree, 2007 WL 3262188, at *2; In
re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 199 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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information. 21 Therefore, a problem arises when a proxy statement omits
or misstates information that stockholders would consider important in
making a decision. 22 To determine whether information is material, the
key inquiry is whether the information is merely helpful or if the
information somehow rises to the level of importance or materiality.2 3
Omitted facts are not material simply because a stockholder would
consider the facts to be helpful in making a decision. 24 Additionally, a
complaint alleging a failure to disclose free cash flows, for example,
must allege that the omitted information is inconsistent with, or
significantly differs from, the disclosed information. 25 Therefore, for a
court to find an omitted fact to be material to the reasonable stockholder,
the omitted fact must be more than merely helpful, must significantly
differ from already disclosed information, and the reasonable stockholder
26must consider the fact important in deciding how to vote.
To state a colorable disclosure claim, the plaintiffe7 bears the burden
to "provide some basis for a court to infer that the alleged violations
were material."28 Additionally, the plaintiff "must allege that facts are
missing from the [information] statement, identify those facts, state why
they meet the materiality standard and how the omissions caused
injury." 29 These two requirements place a fairly heavy burden on the
plaintiff and establish a presumption of non-materiality.
Delaware courts first addressed whether disclosure of free cash
flows is required in a merger proxy 3 0 or tender offer in Skeen v. Jo-Ann
Stores, Inc.,31 a case the Delaware Supreme Court decided in 2000.
Skeen involved a two-step merger-similar to the example at the
21. Skeen, 750 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 2000) (citing Louden v. Archer-Daniels
Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 142 (Del. 1997)); In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 199 (Del. Ch.
2007); In re Best Lock Corp. S'holder Litig., 845 A.2d 1057, 1068 (Del Ch. 2001).
22. See, e.g., Skeen, 750 A.2d at 1171, 1174 (Del. 2000).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1174.
25. Id; In re Checkfree, 2007 WL 3262188, at *2.
26. Skeen, 750 A.2d at 1174.
27. The plaintiff in this situation is a shareholder of the target corporation, alleging a
disclosure violation, who faces the decision of whether to accept the consideration
offered by the acquiring corporation in the tender offer or to decline to tender his shares
and either later accept the merger consideration as part of the proposed second-step
merger or seek appraisal rights after the consummation of the merger.
28. Skeen, 750 A.2d at 1173; In re Checkfree, 2007 WL 3262188, at *2; In re Best
Lock Corp. S'holder Litig., 845 A.2d 1057, 1070 (Del Ch. 2001).
29. Skeen, 750 A.2d at 1173; In re Checkfree, 2007 WL 3262188, at *2; In re Best
Lock, 845 A.2d at 1070.
30. See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, ESSENTIALS: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONs 244-45
(Vicki Bean et al. eds., 2009). The proxy statement is a document soliciting shareholder
approval of the merger, the purpose of which is to give shareholders enough information
about the deal to allow them to make an informed vote on the transaction. Id.
31. Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170 (Del. 2000).
2011] 581
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
beginning of this Comment-with a first-step tender offer, in which the
acquiring corporation acquired 77% of the target corporation's stock.32
A second-step merger followed, in which the majority shareholder
cashed out the minority stockholders. 3 The majority stockholders of the
target corporation approved the merger. 34 The appellants alleged that the
target corporation's directors needed to disclose management's
projections of the target corporation's anticipated performance,
specifically the free cash flow projections from 1998-2003." The
appellants in Skeen, minority shareholders of the target corporation,
argued that the directors failed to provide the minority stockholders with
enough financial information to allow them to decide whether to accept
the merger consideration or to seek appraisal.36
The Delaware Supreme Court stated that the minority stockholders
failed to allege any fact indicating that the omitted information was
material.37 The court held that the minority shareholders were not
entitled to all the financial data necessary to make an independent
determination of fair value merely because the information would be
helpful.3 8 Furthermore, the court noted that the appellants failed to argue
that the undisclosed information was inconsistent with or significantly
differed from the already disclosed information. 39  Thus, the court
established an important difference between material and helpful
*40information.
The Delaware Supreme Court appeared to decide the materiality of
free cash flow projections issue in Skeen,4' but several subsequent cases
appeared before the Delaware Court of Chancery. In 2001, the Delaware
Court of Chancery again addressed the materiality of free cash flow
42
projections in In re Best Lock Corp. Shareholder Litigation. There, the
majority shareholder cashed out the plaintiffs, minority shareholders of
the target corporation, in a freezeout merger.43 The plaintiffs alleged that
the information statement was materially false and misleading because
the statement improperly omitted financial projections that were
32. Id. at 1171.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1173-74. The appellants argued that the disclosure of the additional
financial data would help the stockholders to better evaluate whether they should pursue
an appraisal. Id.
36. Id. at 1171.




41. And, in fact, many practitioners would argue that the issue was decided in Skeen.
42. In re Best Lock Corp. S'holder Litig., 845 A.2d 1057 (Del. Ch. 2001).
43. Id. at 1062.
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provided to the investment bank in performing its fairness opinion.44
The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and held that the
plaintiffs failed to show that the undisclosed information "would have
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of reasonable
shareholders" in deciding whether to pursue their appraisal rights.4 The
court further held that Delaware law does not require that a board
disclose specific details of the analysis underlying a financial advisor's
opinion.46 The court, however, in evaluating the idea of actual
significance, failed to address the concept of who is the reasonable
shareholder.4 7
The Delaware Court of Chancery, in a decision by Vice Chancellor
Strine in 2006, discussed the utility of free cash flow projections in a
post-merger appraisal trial.48 In re PNB Holding Co. Shareholder
Litigation49 involved a cash-out merger, wherein the company
reclassified itself as a subchapter S corporation.o The court's main
focus in the case involved deciding whether to subject the transaction to
entire fairness review, which applies when an interested party is on both
sides of the transaction.5' The court classified pro forma income
statements and projections as "soft information."S2 Vice Chancellor
Strine, while recognizing that the then-current law did not hold all
projections as material, stated "[p]rojections of future performance ...
are also useful, particularly in the context of a cash-out merger."53
Although the court held that the omitted projections were not material,
Vice Chancellor Strine stated that he would have found the projections to
be material if management had proposed the merger shortly after the
chief lending officer prepared the projections.54 Additionally, Vice
Chancellor Strine explained that
[i]n the context of a cash-out merger, reliable management
projections of the company's future prospects are of obvious
materiality to the electorate. After all, the key issue for the
stockholders is whether accepting the merger price is a good deal in
44. Id. at 1068.
45. Id. at 1070 (citing Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985)).
46. Id. at 1073 (citing Skeen, 750 A.2d at 1174).
47. Id. (stating only that "plaintiffs must show that the information missing from the
Information Statement 'would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations' of
reasonable shareholders. . . ." (emphasis added)).
48. In re PNB Holding Co. S'holder Litig., No. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 18, 2006).
49. Id.
50. Id. at *1.
51. Id.
52. Id. at *16.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *15.
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comparison with remaining a shareholder and receiving the future
expected returns of the company.
The first ruling contrary to the Delaware Supreme Court's holding
in Skeen came in 2007 from Vice-Chancellor Strine.56 In re Netsmart
Techs., Inc. Shareholder Litigation57 examined the director's duty to
disclose material facts when seeking stockholder approval of a merger.
The court held that a reasonable stockholder "would find it material to
know what the best estimate was of the company's expected future cash
flows" in deciding whether to accept the merger consideration or to seek
appraisal rights. 59 The target corporation, Netsmart, acquired several
corporations, after which private equity buyers began speaking to
Netsmart management about a possible merger or acquisition.60
Management encouraged the firm to consider a sale to one of the
interested private equity buyers and encouraged the board to focus on a
rapid auction process. 6 1 The board formed a special committee that
ultimately recommended the merger.62 Netsmart subsequently entered
into a merger agreement.63
The plaintiffs in Netsmart alleged that the proxy did not disclose
free cash flow estimates and that those estimates were indeed material.6
More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that management previously
disclosed certain other, older projections but did not disclose the full or
even the most accurate or recent projections.65 The court enjoined the
completion of the merger until Netsmart disclosed the most recent free
cash flow projections.6 6 Vice Chancellor Strine explained that
"projections of this sort are probably among the most highly-prized
disclosures to investors . . . [because investors] cannot hope to ...
replicate management's inside view of the company's prospects."67
55. Id.
56. In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 177.
59. Id.




64. Id. at 176.
65. Id. at 199, 202. The plaintiffs argued that the disclosed projections were not the
projections used by the financial advisor in preparing the DCF analysis but were an older
set of projections. Id. The plaintiffs argued that the time frame was relevant because
they were faced with making an important voting decision to which the projections
directly related. Id.
66. Id. at 177.
67. Id. at 203.
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Thus, for the first time, a Delaware court found that free cash flow
projections were material and were required to be disclosed.
Adding to the disparity, later in 2007, Chancellor Chandler again
ruled, at the preliminary injunction stage, that free cash flow projections
are not material and are not required to be disclosed.68 The target
corporation, Checkfree, received an offer to consummate a merger from
Fiserv at $48 per share, which was higher than all other offers.69 The
target corporation's board subsequently approved the merger agreement
after considering the investment banker's fairness opinion and legal
advice from the company's counsel. 70  The target corporation then
released its proxy statement, which outlined the transaction and the
investment banker's fairness opinion.7 1 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the merger and alleged that the board breached its duty of disclosure by
not including management's financial projections in the proxy
statement.72 Chancellor Chandler held that failing to disclose all of the
financial data necessary to make an independent determination of fair
value is not necessarily misleading shareholders or omitting a material
fact.73 Citing In re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholder Litigation,74 a
decision by Vice Chancellor Strine, the court said that stockholders are
entitled to a fair summary of the investment bankers' substantive work.
Here, the court held that the proxy statement, which the plaintiffs alleged
to be deficient, does, in fact, contain a fair and adequate summary of the
work of the investment bankers.76  The court further expounded that
plaintiffs have the burden of explaining why disclosure of additional
information would significantly alter the total mix of available
information. In holding that shareholders are solely entitled to a fair
and adequate summary of the investment bankers' work, Checkfree
supports a standard of less required disclosure.
68. In re Checkfree Corp. S'holder Litig., No. 3193-CC, 2007 WL 3262188, at *3
(Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2007).
69. Id. at *1.
70. Id.
7 1. Id.
72. Id. at *2. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the board breached its duty of
disclosure by not disclosing certain projections to the shareholders that management had
prepared and shared with the acquiring corporation and its financial advisor. Id.
73. Id. (citing In re Gen. Motors S'holder Litig., 2005 WL 1089021, at *16 (Del. Ch.
2005)).
74. In re Pure Resources, Inc. S'holder Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).




78. Compare Id. at *3 (holding that a fair and adequate summary of the investment
bankers' work does not include free cash flow projections), with Maric Capital Master
Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc., No. 5402-VCS, 2010 WL 1931084, at *2 (Del. Ch.
201l] 585
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Soon after Checkfree, however, the Court of Chancery again
reversed direction in another decision by Vice Chancellor Strine.79
Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc.so involved a
proposed merger wherein Thoma Bravo, LLC, sought to acquire PLATO
Learning, Inc.81  The plaintiffs contended that the proxy statement
selectively disclosed certain projections and, more specifically, that the
proxy did not include the estimates that management provided to the
investment banker. The court preliminarily enjoined the merger until
further disclosures were made. Importantly, Vice Chancellor Strine
stated that, in his view, free cash flow estimates of a corporation are
clearly material information.84
In the most recent of the free cash flow projection materiality line of
cases,85 Chancellor Chandler again ruled that free cash flow projections
are not material.86 The case is ongoing and involves a proposed merger
where Thomas H. Lee seeks to acquire inVentiv. 8 7 The plaintiff argued
that the failure of the proxy statement to include management's free cash
flow estimates prevents the stockholders from being able to decide
May 13, 2010) (holding that free cash flow projections are material and required to be
disclosed to shareholders).
79. Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc., No. 5402-VCS, 2010
WL 1931084 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2010).
80. Id.
81. Id. at *1.
82. Id. at *2.
83. Id. at *3.
84. Id. at *2.
85. After this Comment was written, but before publication, Vice Chancellor Noble
decided another case, Gaines v. Narachi, C.A. No. 6784-VCN, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 157
(Del Ch. Oct. 6, 2011), involving the disclosure of free cash flows. In Narachi, Vice
Chancellor Noble distinguished the case from others by pointing out that the plaintiffs
were not being cashed out and would remain entitled to a portion of the acquiring
corporation's future cash flows. Id. at *4. Vice Chancellor Noble stated that
[a]lthough the Proxy disclosed the EBIT projections-essentially a precursor to
free cash flow-used by Morgan Stanley in its DCF analysis, the Proxy did not
disclose the related free cash flow estimates. This Court has stated that
shareholders who are being advised to cash out are entitled to the best estimate
of the company's future cash flows. While application of this standard has not
always resulted in a finding that free cash flows, specifically, must be
disclosed, there is a colorable argument that, in this case, free cash flows should
be disclosed to meet this standard. Indeed, in Maric this Court enjoined the
proposed merger until free cash flow projections were disclosed, despite the
fact that the proxy already disclosed projected revenues, EBIT, and a variation
of EBITDA. . . . In conclusion, the Plaintiff has pled a colorable claim that the
Proxy's omission of the free cash flow projections utilized by Morgan Stanley
is a material omission that raises a threat of irreparable injury.
Id. at *5 (citations omitted).
86. Steamfitters Local Union 447 v. Walter, No. 5492-CC, slip op. (Del. Ch. June
21, 2010).
87. Id. at 7.
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whether to vote for the merger or seek appraisal. Chancellor Chandler
held that, under these facts, while free cash flow information would add
to the total mix of available information, that information "would [not]
meaningfully alter the total mix of information available through the
definitive proxy on that point." 9  Chancellor Chandler again
distinguished the case from Maric and Netsmart by highlighting that
inVentiv's board did not partially disclose or deliberately excise free
cash flows.90 Importantly, however, Chancellor Chandler offered to sign
an order certifying an interlocutory appeal to the Delaware Supreme
Court on whether, as a per se rule, disclosure of free cash flow
projections are always required.9' The plaintiff decided not to pursue the
interlocutory appeal.92 Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court is unlikely to
address the issue of whether free cash flow projections are material in the
near future, leaving continued ambiguity as boards of directors and
attorneys decide which disclosures are necessary.
III. ANALYSIS
This section explores why the current rule in Delaware is
problematic, stressing the divide in the decisions by Chancellor Chandler
and Vice Chancellor Strine. From there, this section analyzes the
concept of the reasonable stockholder, the relevance of financial theory,
the public policy reasons for why a per se rule should be adopted, and the
treatment of free cash flow projections regarding materiality both under
the Federal Securities Laws and select European laws.
A. Problems with the Current Rule
The disparity in Delaware case law concerning whether free cash
flow projections are material and required to be disclosed has caused
confusion among the practicing bar.93 The problem with how the law
currently stands is that the law is in a state of flux and nothing is clear or
easy to follow. More specifically, an attorney representing a target
88. Id.
89. Id. at 8.
90. Compare id. at 9 (holding that, when no partial disclosure was made, free cash
flow projections are not material and not required to be disclosed), with Maric, 2010 WL
1931084, at *2 (holding that free cash flow projections, in a situation when there had
been partial disclosure of the projections, are material and required to be disclosed to
shareholders).
91. Steamfitters, No. 5492-CC, slip op. at 10; see supra note 9 and accompanying
text.
92. E-mail from Lisa A. Schmidt, Director, Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., to
author (Aug. 26, 2010, 17:26 EST) (on file with author); see supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
93. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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corporation's board of directors does not know whether to disclose free
cash flows when anticipating shareholder action. Additionally,
according to current case law, plaintiffs are more likely to succeed when
management partially discloses projections, particularly if those
disclosures are outdated.94 Because the board may violate its fiduciary
duty of disclosure if partial or outdated projections are disclosed,9 5 the
decision of what and when to disclose becomes even more complicated.
Delaware's choice not to establish a per se rule requiring the
disclosure of internal free cash flow projections has caused more
confusion and complication than necessary.96 Delaware's rule resembles
a balancing test: trying not to provide shareholders with excess
information while still attempting to provide all of the material
information needed to take an informed action.97 The court's fear is that
an overabundance of information will burden the stockholder with excess
irrelevant information through which it would be nearly impossible to
sift.98 In the case of shareholder disclosure, the balance between not
disclosing enough information and an overabundance of information is
delicate.99  Thus, a board's failure to disclose material, or even
potentially material information, to a stockholder could be more
damaging to the stockholder than an overabundance of information. 00
Navigating this delicate balance, the Delaware Court of Chancery
held that stockholders are entitled to a fair summary of the investment
94. In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 199 (Del. Ch. 2007);
Paul H. Dawes & Jessica L. Hubley, The Disclosure of Management Projections Under
Delaware Law, 1762 PLI/CORP 441, 446 (2009).
95. Dawes, supra note 94, at 446. Because shareholders base their decision of
whether to accept the merger consideration on the disclosed information, partial or
outdated disclosures can mislead the shareholders. Id. When partial or outdated
disclosures are made, management should disclose full and updated information to
comply with both Federal and Delaware law, and to avoid violating the fiduciary duty of
disclosure. Id.
96. See id. at 445. Attorneys have to consider both the federal securities laws and
state law disclosure requirements, along with various public policy issues that call for a
fact specific analysis, with no clear outcome. Id.
97. See In re General Motors (Hughes) S'holder Litig., No. 20269, 2005 WL
1089021, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005) ("Delaware law does not require 'directors to
bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information. Otherwise, shareholder
solicitations would become so detailed and voluminous that they will no longer serve
their purpose."') (citing Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1130 (Del. Ch.1999)).
98. Seeid.at*13.
99. See, e.g., id. at *13.
100. See In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 360-61 (Del. Ch. 2008).
An example of where a board's failure to disclose material information to a shareholder is
more damaging than disclosing too much information is most apparent when there has
been irreparable harm to the stockholders as a result of the board's failure to disclose
information. Id.
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bankers' substantive work.'0 ' The court set forth a broad, inclusive list
of what falls within the "substantive work of investment bankers"
including assumptions, valuation exercises, and the range of values
generated with that data.10 2 However, some academics maintain that a
"fair summary of the substantive work performed" does not include
publication and disclosure of the underlying projections. 03 Other cases
in Delaware have since held that information such as underlying
projections are indeed important and even material. 104
B. Distinguishing Factors Between Chandler and Strine
Vice Chancellor Strine said in PNB, a post-merger appraisal trial,
that reliable management projections are of "obvious materiality to the
[shareholders]."10 5  Strine based the materiality of management
projections on the importance of the decision stockholders face in
deciding whether to accept the merger consideration or pursue their
appraisal rights.o' The court has since held in opinions authored by
Strine that management projections are material in both Netsmart and
Maric.107 Conversely, Chancellor Chandler stated that "[a] disclosure
that does not include all financial data necessary to make an independent
determination of fair value is not ... per se misleading or omitting a
material fact."' 08  Because these views contradict each other, with the
conflicting cases arising during the same time period and within the same
jurisdiction,' 0 9 the factors on which the judges distinguished the cases are
important to explore and to analyze.
First, Chancellor Chandler distinguished Checkfree from Vice
Chancellor Strine's decision in Netsmart by pointing out that the proxy
statement in Netsmart "affirmatively disclosed an early version of some
101. In re Pure Resources, Inc. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 449 (Del. Ch. 2002).
102. Id. at 449.
103. Dawes, supra note 94, at 448.
104. See Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc., No. 5402-VCS,
2010 WL 1931084 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2010) (holding that free cash flow projections are
material and required to be disclosed to shareholders); In re PNB Holding Co. S'holders
Litig., No. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (holding that estimates of a
company's future earnings, if reliable enough to aid stockholders in making an informed
judgment, are material).
105. In re PNB, 2006 WL 2403999, at *16. See also Zim v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d
1050, 1059 n.4 (Del. 1996).
106. See In re PNB, 2006 WL 2403999, at *16.
107. Maric, 2010 WL 1931084, at *2; In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holder Litig., 924
A.2d 171, 177 (Del. Ch. 2007).
108. In re Checkfree Corp. S'holder Litig., No. 3193-CC, 2007 WL 3262188, at *2
(Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2007) (citing In re General Motors (Hughes) S'holder Litig., No.
20269, 2005 WL 1089021, at * 16 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005)).
109. See supra Section III.A.
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of management's projections,"" 0 while that was not the case in
Checkfree.' An important point, helping to explain the reasoning
behind the Checkfree decision, is that management had already disclosed
estimated earnings for two years, making the plaintiffs disclosure
argument less relevant. 12  Chancellor Chandler further distinguished
Netsmart by emphasizing Vice Chancellor Strine's statement that further
disclosure was required once "a board broache[d] a topic in its
disclosures."1 l3  Chancellor Chandler also focused on the inherent
unreliability of projections, and that, because of their unreliability,
projections sometimes mislead shareholders and are speculative at
best.'14
As mentioned previously, Pure Resources set out the principle that
stockholders are entitled to a fair summary of the investment bankers'
substantive work."' Interestingly, both Chancellor Chandler and Vice
Chancellor Strine rely on this principle but for opposite reasons.116
Checkfree, a decision by Chancellor Chandler, stands for the proposition
that a fair and adequate summary does not need to include management's
projections to fulfill the Pure Resources' standard.'17  Chancellor
Chandler attempted to set Checkfree apart from Netsmart by stating that
the proxy at issue in Netsmart did not include such a fair and adequate
summary.118 Vice Chancellor Strine, the judge who decided Pure
Resources, on the other hand, stated that management's internal
projections are necessary for there to be a fair and adequate summary.' 19
Vice Chancellor Strine maintained that the valuation methods, key
inputs, and ultimate values the investment bankers generate must be
fairly disclosed.120  Because Vice Chancellor Strine focuses on the




114. Id. (citing In re PNB Holding Co. S'holders Litig., No. 28-N, 2006 WL
2403999, at *16 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006)).
115. In re Pure Resources, Inc. S'holder Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 449 (Del. Ch. 2002).
See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
116. Compare In re Checkfree, 2007 WL 3262188, at *3 (holding that a fair and
adequate summary under Pure Resources does not require disclosure of management's
projections), with In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 204 (Del. Ch.
2007) (holding that a fair and adequate summary under Pure Resources requires
disclosure of management's internal projections).
117. In re Checkfree, 2007 WL 3262188, at *3. See also In re Best Lock Corp.
S'holder Litig., 845 A.2d 1057, 1073 (Del. Ch. 2001) (stating that a board does not need
to disclose the specific details of the analysis underlying the financial advisor's opinion).
118. In re Checkfree, 2007 WL 3262188, at *3.
119. In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 204.
120. Id.
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importance of the decision a shareholder must make in a merger, 12' and
Chancellor Chandler focuses on the level of information to which a
shareholder is entitled,122 the Delaware Supreme Court should resolve
these diverging views and clarify when free cash flows are material.
Such a clarification would prevent confusion among lawyers as they
counsel their clients on what information is material and required to be
disclosed.123
C. The Reasonable Stockholder
Determination of materiality involves a fact-specific inquiry and "is
to be assessed from the viewpoint of the 'reasonable' stockholder, not
from a director's subjective perspective."l24 Delaware case law does
little to elaborate or expound upon the concept of the reasonable
stockholder,125 merely mentioning that the materiality standard is
objective and should be measured from the viewpoint of the reasonable
investor.126 Because the law holds materiality to a reasonable investor
standard,127 Delaware courts should develop more fully the concept of
the reasonable investor to better convey when information is material.
The concept of the reasonable investor is difficult to define;
however, courts and scholars have identified certain characteristics that
are often attributed to the reasonable investor.12 8 The first attribute of the
reasonable investor is that the reasonable investor is rational.' 2 9 Second,
the concept of the reasonable investor may be broad enough to include
speculators who, through their own efforts, tend to be well informed both
about the market in general and their particular investments.' The
121. See In re PNB Holding Co. S'holders Litig., No. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999, at
*16 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006).
122. See In re Checkfree, 2007 WL 3262188, at *2.
123. See infra Section IV.
124. Arnold v. Soc'y for Say. Bancorp., Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1994) (citing
Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 779 (Del. 1993)).
125. Stockholder is synonymous with shareholder and investor as used in this
Comment.
126. See, e.g., Zirn, 621 A.2d at 779.
127. See, e.g., id.
128. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Female Investors and Securities Fraud: Is the
Reasonable Investor a Woman?, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 296 (2009).
129. See, e.g., DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 492 F.3d 209, 218 (3d Cir. 2007)
(discussing the concerns of a reasonable investor and assuming that a reasonable investor
engages in cost-benefit analysis). Case law supports the proposition that the reasonable
investor is a rational investor, without making this view explicit. See also Heminway,
supra note 128, at 296-97.
130. Heminway, supra note 128, at 298-99 (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 11
(1934); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 n.10 (2d Cir. 1968)).
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals, explaining the speculator concept,
stated:
The intelligent speculator assumes that facts are available for a
thorough analysis. The speculator then examines the facts to
discover and evaluate the risks that are present. He then balances
these risks against the apparent opportunities for capital gains and
makes his decision accordingly. He is, to the best of his ability,
taking calculated risks. 3 1
The idea that the speculator is a calculated risk taker goes hand in hand
with the idea of a reasonable investor who examines facts, pulls in data,
and makes decisions based upon a reasonable calculation of the various
alternatives.
Further expanding the concept of the reasonable investor, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "the . .. chartists of Wall and
Bay Streets are . . . 'reasonable' investors."' 3 2  Chartists, as the name
hints, are investors that use historical data to track trends in the market,
using their charts to decide where, when, and how to invest.13 3
Moreover, the reasonable investor concept includes those who engage in
fundamental analysis.13 4 Fundamental analysis involves calculating the
fair market value of a company's outstanding shares by plugging in
various numbers, including the company's earnings. 35
Additionally, several courts have found that reasonable investors are
sophisticated investors who appreciate the complexity of transactions,
understand that an investment involves a certain level of risk, and make
calculated decisions to maximize their investments.13 6  Thus, many
courts view the reasonable investor as rational, sophisticated, a chartist,
and potentially a speculator.13 7 Because of this view, the reasonable
investor can be defined as an investor who researches his decisions,
knows how to perform calculations, understands the meaning and
significance of the results of his calculations, and determines the inherent
value of his investments when making decisions on how to invest.' A
131. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 849 n.10.
132. Id. at 849.
133. See Heminway, supra note 128, at 299-300 (citing Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d
1169, 1182 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Gilbert, No. S80 Cr. 493-CSH, 1981 WL
1662, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 1981)).
134. See id. at 300.
135. See id.
136. See, e.g., Flamm, 814 F.2d at 1175; No. 84 Emp'r-Teamster Joint Council
Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 935 (9th Cir. 2003).
137. See Heminway, supra note 128, at 296.
138. See id. at 301.
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reasonable investor, therefore, would use free cash flow projections in
his analysis and decision making process. 3 9
Discordantly, Professor Sachs argues that the reasonable investor is
the "least sophisticated investor," meaning that the reasonable investor is
simple and does not rationally think out his investment decisions.140
However, while attempting to make her case, Professor Sachs concedes
that sophistication and rationality are, in fact, commonly associated with
the reasonable investor,141 further strengthening the argument that the
law's current view of the reasonable investor as a sophisticated,
calculating investor who rationally considers all options before making
an investment decision is accurate. 14 2  By viewing the reasonable
investor as a sophisticated investor with the attributes described above,
the Delaware Supreme Court is likely to find that free cash flow
projections are material to the reasonable investor. By finding that free
cash flow projections are material to the reasonable investor, the
Delaware Supreme Court should require the disclosure of projected free
cash flows in a merger proxy or tender offer.
D. Implications ofFinancial Theory
Standard financial theory and practice base the value of stock and
the corporation in general on the expected future cash flows of a
corporation. 143 These free cash flow estimates, along with the
appropriate discount rate, are used to discount the future value of the
cash flows to determine the present value, using a discounted cash flow
(DCF) analysis to calculate the net present value (NPV) of the
investment. 14 4 The present value of the projected free cash flows is used
to determine the value of the company as a going concern.145 The going
139. See, e.g., id. at 300 (explaining that reasonable investors engage in fundamental
analysis, which focuses on the intrinsic value of stocks. Intrinsic value is based on, inter
alia, earnings and the factor of management).
140. Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing "the
Reasonable Investor" with "the Least Sophisticated Investor" in Inefficient Markets, 81
TUL. L. REV. 473, 473 (2006).
141. Id. at 504.
142. See Heminway, supra note 128, at 301.
143. See Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc., No. 5402-VCS,
2010 WL 1931084, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2010). See generally Nagy v. Bistricer, 770
A.2d 43, 48 (Del. Ch. 2000) (explaining that the merger consideration to be paid would
be adjusted based on a to-be-obtained valuation of the target that was calculated based on
management's projections, among other factors).
144. See In re PNB Holding Co. S'holders Litig., No. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999, at
*20 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006); KEOWN, supra note 1, at 147; THOMPSON, supra note 1, at
372; Dawes, supra note 94, at 448.
145. See MacLane Gas Co. Ltd., P'ship v. Enserch Corp., No. 10760, 1992 WL
368614, at *15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 1992).
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concern value is then divided by the number of outstanding shares to
determine the per share value of the company.14 6 Thus, free cash flows
are important in valuing a company.147
Understandably then, a lack of free cash flow estimates creates
difficulty for a stockholder who is trying to understand how the
investment banker valued the company.148  Furthermore, materially
inaccurate free cash flows greatly impact the determination of whether
the merger consideration is indeed a fair representation of the value of
the company and the value of each share of the company's stock.149 This
analysis is relevant in a merger or tender offer context as stockholders
ask themselves whether the price being offered as the merger
consideration is "fair compensation for the benefits [the stockholder] will
receive ... from the future expected cash flows of the corporation if the
corporation remains as a going concern."o50 The importance of projected
free cash flows to an investor's analysis when deciding whether the price
offered as consideration in the merger is fair strengthens the argument of
materiality in favor of the Delaware Supreme Court finding that free cash
flow projections are material.
E. Public Policy
The overriding concern governing disclosure in Delaware is the
court's effort to provide shareholders with all of the material information
needed to make an informed decision while not overburdening
shareholders with excess information.' 5' As discussed previously,15 2 the
balance between not enough information and an overabundance of
information is delicate and difficult to navigate.15 3 While the dangers of
146. See generally London v. Tyrrell, No. 3321-CC, 2010 WL 877528, at *4 (Del Ch.
Mar. 11, 2010) (stating that the per share value was calculated in an effort to adequately
value the company).
147. See generally In re PNB, 2006 WL 2403999, at *20 (relating that a DCF
analysis, involving free cash flow estimates, is necessary in valuing a company).
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc., No. 5402-VCS, 2010
WL 1931084, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2010).
151. See In re General Motors (Hughes) S'holder Litig., No. 20269, 2005 WL
1089021, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005) (citing Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098,
1130 (Del. Ch.1999)). The court worries that increased disclosure would lead to an
overabundance of information and would burden the stockholder with a large amount of
irrelevant or unimportant information through which it would be difficult to sift. Id.
152. See supra Section III.A.
153. See, e.g., In re General Motors, 2005 WL 1089021, at *13 ("Delaware law does
not require 'directors to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information.
Otherwise, shareholder solicitations would become so detailed and voluminous that they
will no longer serve their purpose."').
594 [Vol. 116:2
DISCLOSURE OF FREE CASH FLOW PROJECTIONS
the target corporation's board disclosing an overabundance of
information are real, 154 the board's failure to disclose material, or
potentially material, information could also cause irreparable harm.
Therefore, in setting a disclosure standard, a court must consider the
utility of the information to be disclosed to the reasonable stockholder.
In assessing utility, a court must decide whether management's free
cash flow projections, which are often used by bankers in forming their
fairness opinion, are material or would contribute to an overabundance of
information.15 6 In Margolis, Vice Chancellor Noble stated:
The key assumptions made by a banker in formulating his opinion are
of paramount importance to the stockholders because any valuation
analysis is heavily dependent upon the projections utilized. A proxy
statement should "give the stockholders the best estimate of the
company's future cash flows as of the time the board approved the
[transaction]." 57
By stressing the value of projections, Vice Chancellor Noble's opinion
contributes to the argument that, as a matter of public policy, future cash
flow estimates are material and always should be disclosed to
stockholders in a merger proxy situation.'5 8  The Delaware Supreme
Court reasonably could conclude that the utility of free cash flow
projections to shareholders outweighs the fear of providing the
shareholders with an overabundance of information, leading to the court
finding that free cash flows are material as a matter of public policy.
154. A large quantity of disclosed information would be, inter alia, difficult for a
stockholder to sift through, find what information is meaningful, and make an informed
decision. Given the seriousness of the situation in a merger transaction when a
stockholder is likely choosing whether to relinquish ownership and turn over control of
his shares, the decision of whether to tender or sell shares and how to vote on the pending
transaction has added importance.
155. See In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 360-61 (Del. Ch. 2008)
(stating that a breach of the duty of disclosure leads to irreparable harm because of an
inability of the court to rectify any harm after the fact, leading the court to grant
injunctive relief to prevent shareholders from voting without complete and accurate
information).
156. Utility, as used in this context, refers to the balance between the materiality of
the free cash flow projections and the need for the target corporation to not provide the
shareholders with excess information.
157. David P. Simonetti Rollover IRA v. Margolis, No. 3694-VCN, 2008 WL
5048692, at *10 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008) (citing In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holder
Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 203 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
158. Id.
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F. Result Under Securities Laws1 5 9
Because the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the federal securities
law materiality standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court, an
analysis of materiality under the federal securities laws is directly
relevant to the issue of materiality in Delaware. 160 The Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "SEC") frequently argues that disclosure of
free cash flow projections are material and are even more likely to be
material when there has already been partial disclosure.161 Thus, an
attorney often must consider both federal securities law and Delaware
law when evaluating whether to disclose management projections. 162
In securities law, materiality is a question of fact.16' Thus, for
example, in a Rule lOb-5 case,164 materiality is typically a jury question,
"requiring an assessment of the inferences that a reasonable shareholder
would draw from a given set of facts."1 6 5 In evaluating the materiality of
projections in a situation involving securities, the Second Circuit stated
that
material facts include not only information disclosing the earnings
and distributions of a company but also those facts which affect the
probable future of the company and those which may affect the desire
of investors to buy, sell, or hold the company's securities.166
This broad definition of what constitutes a material fact under the
securities laws explicitly leads to the inclusion of facts affecting the
future of the company, 16 7 such as free cash flow projections.
159. See Dawes, supra note 94, at 445 (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 446-47 (1976)). This section is relevant to the overall discussion of the
materiality of free cash flow projections because Delaware adopted its disclosure rules
from a securities law standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court. See
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985). Federal securities laws deal
with the issuance of securities as well as the trading of securities that are already in the
marketplace. See Dawes, supra note 94, at 445. The principal federal laws governing
securities are the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act), 15 U.S.C. § 77a, and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), 15 U.S.C. § 78a.
160. Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 944.
161. See Dawes, supra note 94, at 459.
162. Id. at 445.
163. Stefan J. Padfield, Who Should Do the Math? Materiality Issues in Disclosures
That Require Investors to Calculate the Bottom Line, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 927, 937 (2007).
164. Rule lOb-5 is a provision under the '34 Act that deals with fraudulent schemes
and untrue statements concerning material facts, both made and omitted. Liability under
Rule 1Ob-5 requires scienter, unlike liability under Section 12 of the '33 Act.
165. Padfield, supra note 163, at 937 (citing Marksman Partners L.P. v. Chantal
Pharm., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1305-06 (C.D. Cal. 1996)).
166. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968).
167. See id.
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While materiality is a question of fact, there are times when parties
to a transaction are required to make certain disclosures. One example of
when parties are required to disclose certain financial information is in
the context of a going private transaction under Rule 13e-3 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.68 These disclosures include, as the
SEC states in Regulation M-A, statements of pro forma information 6 9
and cash flows. 170 By explicitly requiring disclosure of projections in
this context, the SEC shows that free cash flows are, at least in this
instance, material and important to the SEC in its evaluation of the
proposed transaction. Because Delaware adopted the materiality
standard from the federal securities laws,' 7 1 the SEC requiring the
disclosure of financial projections and free cash flows in certain
circumstances strongly supports Delaware also requiring that free cash
flows be disclosed.
To have a successful securities fraud claim, a plaintiff must prove
that he relied on the material misstatement or omission in his decision to
buy or sell the security in question to establish liability.17 2 Also, when
securities are involved, an omission or misstatement of a material fact
can lead to strict liability by the seller of the security.173 When a court
finds that an omitted or misstated fact is material, which may very well
be the case when free cash flows are omitted, the seller of the securities
may then be liable to the purchaser.' 7 4 An inclusion of free cash flows as
part of required disclosure under the securities laws presents a
compelling course for the Delaware Supreme Court to follow when it
considers whether free cash flows are material information and thus
required to be disclosed.
168. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2008).
169. KEOWN, supra note 2, at 107 (explaining that pro forma financial statements are
a collection of financial forecasts used by corporations in budgeting and planning
activities).
170. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1010 (1999).
171. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985).
172. Padfield, supra note 163, at 937 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
243 (1988)).
173. If the security falls under Rule lOb-5 of the '34 Act, scienter is required. Under
Section 12(a)(2) of the '33 Act, there is a reasonable care defense for the seller of such
securities who maintains the burden of proof. Section 12(a)(1) of the '33 Act is a non-
fault liability provision.
174. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 771(a). Section 12(a)(2) of the '33 Act states that a person
who offers or sells a security through any oral or written prospectus "which includes an
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading" is liable to the person who purchased such security from him. This is a strict
liability standard when there is a material omission.
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G. A Comparative View
Disclosure obligations in Europe vary depending on the country and
nature of the issue. 175 Some European nations promote a broad duty of
disclosure and feel that shareholders should have virtually unlimited
access to information about the corporation.176 Other European nations
have disclosure laws remarkably similar to that of the United States. 177
While European law does not govern United States transactions, courts
in the United States can analyze the various European approaches and
use them as a roadmap for U.S. transactions when beneficial.
One such European approach is found in Switzerland.178  In the
context of asset-backed securities, Swiss law requires that the prospectus
"contain a summary of the transaction and a transaction overview."l79
This summary and overview must include, inter alia, the key elements of
the transaction, be easily understood by potential investors, discuss the
risks involved, and discuss the overall structure of the transaction. 80 The
Swiss approach is a broad, inclusive approach to disclosure. Other
countries have an approach similar to the Swiss approach, like Russia,
which expanded disclosure obligations to include, inter alia, disclosure
of significant events, including major corporate actions, changes in
management, and changes in asset values or profits/losses by more than
ten percent.18' The approaches of these countries are broad because they
are aimed at expanding disclosure. When applied to free cash flows,
these approaches likely would. regard such cash flows as a required item
of disclosure.
Alternatively, the German approach to materiality and disclosure is
much like the current United States approach under the securities laws. 182
In Germany, in reference to inside information, materiality is defined as
information "of a kind that, if disclosed, could have a substantial effect
175. This Comment does not attempt to provide an extensive look at the disclosure
duties of any one country. Rather, the focus is to provide a few insights into select
European laws that the court may find applicable to the disclosure of free cash flows in
Delaware.
176. See European Law Digests, 1 IRELAND LAW DIGEST 2.04 (describing the duty of
disclosure as a duty of transparency).
177. Harmut Krause, The German Securities Trading Act (1994): A Ban on Insider
Trading and an Issuer's Affirmative Duty to Disclose Material Nonpublic Information, 30
INT'L LAWYER 555, 566 (1996).
178. Michael S. Sackheim et al., International Securities and Derivatives, 33 INT'L
LAWYER 449, 465-66 (1999).
179. Id. at 467.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 468 (citing Commission Res. No. 32 (Aug. 12, 1998)) (describing
significant events as including "major corporate actions, changes in management, and
changes in asset values or profits/losses by more than ten percent").
182. Krause, supra note 177, at 566.
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on the market price."a Given this test of materiality, it is hard to
foresee a situation when an issue of materiality would come out
differently under United States law than it would under German law.'8 4
Additionally, German securities issuers have an affirmative
responsibility to disclose "information that is new, has originated in the
field of the issuer's activities, is unknown to the public, and may
substantially influence the market price because it has a bearing on the
issuer's asset and financial situation or its general business prospects." 85
Given its similarity to the United States system, courts in Germany have
had similar problems determining where to draw the line between
material and nonmaterial information,1 8 6 such as in the case of free cash
flows. A key difference between the United States and German
securities markets, however, is that the number of issuers registered on
the German market is remarkably low.1 87
A third view, different than that of the United States, is that of
Spain.' 88 Spain allows shareholders broad access to information of the
corporation, maintaining certain minimum requirements that can be
altered by the company's articles of incorporation.18 1 Shareholders are
allowed access to all "relevant documentation relating to the items on the
agenda," which include, inter alia, "annual accounts, management
reports, audit reports, complete text of proposals on resolutions
submitted by the Board to the shareholders' meeting, as well as any
report of the Board on such proposals." 90 Disclosure on this level
usually arises in conjunction with a shareholders' meeting,191 such as the
one that would take place to vote on a merger. The only time such
183. Id. at 565.
184. Compare EC Insider Trading Directive, Council Directive 89/592 of 13
November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing 1989, O.J. (L 334) 130, art.
1(1) (determining materiality by looking at "information which . . . if it were made
public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the [security]."), and
Krause, supra note 177, at 566 (focusing on the impact that information has on the
reasonable investor when determining materiality), with TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976) (stating that "[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote").
185. Krause, supra note 177, at 582.
186. See id. at 566. Germany also balances public policy concerns of overburdening
shareholders with excess information with the difficulty for issuers in identifying what is
material. Id.
187. Id. at 564 (explaining that fewer than 700 corporations are listed on the German
stock exchanges).
188. Ura Mendez et al., SOCIETAs EUROPAEA, THE EUROPEAN COMPANY ACROSS
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disclosure is not required in Spain is when "disclosure of the information
would damage the corporate interests."' 9 2 This approach is most closely
related to that of Switzerland, with both having broad definitions of
materiality and items required to be disclosed.19 3 Such a broad definition
of materiality most likely leads to required disclosure of free cash flows,
especially upon a demand by the shareholders.
As discussed above, Swiss, Russian, and Spanish law all support a
broad definition of materiality, while German law has an approach to
determining materiality similar to that found in the US. Because of the
broad definition of materiality adopted by the countries discussed above,
free cash flows likely would be deemed material, presenting another
possible course for the Delaware Supreme Court to follow as it
determines whether free cash flows are material information.
IV. PROPOSED RULE
Because of the problems with the current disclosure rule under
Delaware common law and the policy considerations discussed above,
this Comment proposes that the Delaware Supreme Court require, by
means of a rebuttable presumption,' 94 that projected free cash flows be
deemed material and required to be disclosed to stockholders in a merger
proxy or tender offer situation. The adoption of a rebuttable presumption
ensures that stockholders have all of the material information needed to
make an informed decision and that they can make their decision without
over burdensome, excess information. 195
Courts should assess materiality under Delaware law from the
viewpoint of the reasonable stockholder.19 6 When adopting a rebuttable
presumption of materiality of free cash flow projections, Delaware
should further develop the concept of the reasonable investor to provide
more guidance to courts and the practicing bar. By defining the
reasonable investor as a sophisticated investor who researches his
decisions and determines the inherent value of his investments when
making decisions on how to invest,' 9 7 Delaware law would provide
sufficient guidance to courts and attorneys as they determine whether the
192. Id.
193. Compare Sackheim, supra note 178, at 467 (stating that the prospectus must
contain a transaction overview which provides the key elements of the transaction), with
Mendez, supra note 188, at 7.2 (stating that shareholders are allowed broad access to all
relevant documents).
194. The fact finder would still have the ability to decide that free cash flows are not
material in a given situation and thus not require disclosure. In a large majority of cases,
however, the target corporation would be required to disclose free cash flows.
195. See supra Section IlI.E.
196. Zim v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 779 (Del. 1993). See supra Section III.C.
197. See Heminway, supra note 128, at 301.
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given financial information is material. In the context of free cash flow
projections, the courts' finding that the reasonable investor is a
sophisticated investor who makes an informed judgment concerning his
vote supports the proposed rule that free cash flow projections are
material. When analyzing materiality from a more thoroughly defined
concept of the reasonable shareholder, the Delaware Supreme Court
reasonably should conclude that free cash flow projections are
material. 19 8
An evaluation of the importance of free cash flow projections under
financial theory further strengthens the argument in favor of the
Delaware Supreme Court finding that free cash flow projections are
material. 199  By clarifying the materiality standard to stress the
importance of free cash flows in a stockholder's analysis, Delaware
would be expounding upon and following case law found in Weinberger
as it relates to valuation.2 0 0  Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court
reasonably could conclude that free cash flows are a key piece of the
analysis a stockholder goes through in determining how to vote, finding
further support for adopting a rebuttable presumption that free cash flows
are material.2 01
The adoption of a rebuttable presumption ensures that the
stockholders have all of the material information needed to make an
informed decision while not overburdening the shareholders with excess
information.20 2 A rebuttable presumption is favorable for the investor,
has the potential to attract more investors to Delaware corporations, and
would be an easy measure for companies to implement. Furthermore, it
would carry few negative side effects. The adoption of such a clear rule
would prevent the confusion that currently exists as attorneys seek how
to best counsel their clients and boards decide what information to
disclose to stockholders.20 3 Framing the rule as a rebuttable presumption
allows the defendant, in situations that the court will define, to argue that
198. See In re PNB Holding Co. S'holder Litig., No. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999, at * 15
(Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (stating that "reliable management projections of the company's
future prospects are of obvious materiality to the [shareholders]"). See, e.g.,
DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 492 F.3d 209, 218 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing the
concerns of a reasonable investor and assuming that a reasonable investor engages in
cost-benefit analysis).
199. See supra Section III.D.
200. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983) (stating that generally
accepted valuation techniques used in the financial community can be used in appraisal
and other stock valuation proceedings in Delaware).
201. See In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 177 (Del. Ch.
2007) (stating that a reasonable stockholder would find projected cash flows material).
202. See supra Section III.E.
203. See supra Section III.A.
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free cash flow projections in a given situation are not material and should
not be disclosed.
The court's adoption of a rebuttable presumption would, however,
make non-materiality a difficult burden to meet. Further, while a bright
line rule is easier to follow, it may well be either over or under
inclusive.204 Because the potential benefits to shareholders who are
faced with an important decision in deciding how to vote or whether to
tender their shares outweighs the negative aspect of a potentially over or
under inclusive rule, the adoption of a rebuttable presumption is the best
option for the Delaware Supreme Court.
One method of determining whether the proposed rule is a viable
option is to look at the market reaction to a given transaction, which
serves as strong evidence of materiality or non-materiality.205 if
shareholders have already voted on a transaction, then, by the time a
court could view the market's reaction, it is usually too late to remedy
any harm.206 To prevent harm to the shareholders, the court must adopt a
solution up front that is aimed at preventing the anticipated harm.
Because Delaware courts currently prefer that disclosure claims are
litigated at the preliminary injunction stage, before the shareholder
vote,207 potential harm to the plaintiffs is limited. Litigating claims at the
preliminary injunction stage largely avoids disclosure-based monetary
damages.2 0 8 Monetary damages, however, are not the only harm suffered
by shareholders, meaning that merely requiring that disclosure claims are
litigated at the preliminary injunction stage is not sufficient to prevent all
harm to shareholders. For example, when a breach of the duty of
disclosure falls under the fiduciary duty of care, Section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law exculpates directors from monetary
damages for breaches of the duty of care. Whereas harm is caused to the
shareholders as a result of a failure to disclose material information, that
harm is irreparable because directors are exculpated from monetary
liability under Section 102(b)(7). 20 9 The best way for a court to prevent
harm to shareholders and minimize liability on behalf of corporations, in
a disclosure claim involving free cash flows, is to require, by means of a
204. Padfield, supra note 163, 929 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 458 U.S. 224, 236
(1988)).
205. Id. at 936 (citing In re Merck & Co., Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir.
2005)) (stating that "the materiality of disclosed information may be measured post hoc
by looking to the movement, in the period immediately following disclosure").
206. See In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 361 (Del. Ch. 2008).
207. See Dawes, supra note 94, at 447 (citing In re Transkaryotic, 954 A.2d at 360).
208. See Corinne Ball, Marilyn Sonnie & Anna Triponel, The Board of Directors'
Fiduciary Duties, 1713 PLI/CoRP 131, 162 (2009) (citing In re Netsmart Techs., Inc.
S'holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 208 n. 115 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
209. See In re Transkaryotic, 954 A.2d at 360-61.
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rebuttable presumption, that projected free cash flows be disclosed
upfront to stockholders.210
In addition to preventing irreparable harm to shareholders, increased
disclosure by the target corporation in a merger context will likely
increase the number of investors who are willing to invest in Delaware
corporations. Investors will be more likely to invest in Delaware
corporations because of increased predictability in the market.2 1 1 As
investors come to expect certain actions from corporations, like the
disclosure of free cash flows in a merger, the market will be more stable
and there will be less confusion among attorneys and management as
they try to determine which items are required to be disclosed.
Additionally, disclosure of free cash flow projections requires little extra
effort by the target corporation's management and will result in the target
corporation's shareholders making a more informed decision concerning
the pending vote on the merger transaction. As long as the target
corporation has been open with its shareholders, there are few
foreseeable negative side effects of the additional disclosure.
V. CONCLUSION
While disclosure of free cash flows has been a hotly debated issue
in the past decade, the Delaware Supreme Court has yet to adopt a clear
standard, as evidenced by the most recent advent of cases.212 The
disagreement between Chancellor Chandler and Vice Chancellor Strine
of the Delaware Court of Chancery as to whether free cash flows are
material has led to confusion among target corporation boards of
directors and attorneys who seek to determine what financial information
is material and merits disclosure.213 By adopting a rebuttable
presumption that free cash flow estimates are material, the Delaware
Supreme Court would be following a path that is supported not only by
Delaware case law but also by federal securities law, European law,
210. See discussion supra Section IV.
211. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 n.10 (2d Cir. 1968)
(explaining that "[an investor] examines the facts to discover and evaluate the risks that
are present. He then balances these risks against the apparent opportunities for capital
gains and makes his decision accordingly.").
212. Steamfitters Local Union 447 v. Walter, No. 5492-CC, slip op. at 10 (Del. Ch.
June 21, 2010) (offering to sign an order certifying an interlocutory appeal to the
Delaware Supreme Court on whether, as a per se rule, free cash flow projections are
material). See supra Section II.
213. Compare In re Checkfree Corp. S'holder Litig., No. 3193-CC, 2007 WL
3262188 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2007) (holding that free cash flow projections are not material
and need not be disclosed), with Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc.,
No. 5402-VCS, 2010 WL 1931084 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2010) (holding that free cash flow
projections are material and thus required to be disclosed to shareholders).
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financial theory, and public policy.2 14 The proposed rule is favorable for
the investor, would attract investors to Delaware corporations, is simple
for the target corporation to implement, and would have few negative
ramifications.2 15 Free cash flow projections are central to the
fundamental nature of the target corporation and are central to the
valuation process. Viewing free cash flows in this light makes it hard for
the court to find that free cash flow projections are not material to the
reasonable shareholder. Most importantly, regardless of the path the
Delaware Supreme Court chooses, the problems with the current rule
demonstrate that the Delaware Supreme Court needs to act. The
Delaware Supreme Court's adoption of a rebuttable presumption that
free cash flow projections are material would resolve confusion, follow
existing law, and be advantageous to Delaware corporations.
214. See supra Section III.
215. See supra Section IV.
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